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Abstract 
We investigated whether words relevant to a person’s current goal and words related to this goal 
influence the orienting of attention even when an intention to attend to the goal-relevant and 
goal-related stimuli is not present.  Participants performed a modified spatial cueing paradigm 
combined with a second task that induced a goal.  The results showed that the induced goal led to 
the orienting of attention to goal-relevant words in the spatial cueing task.  This effect was not 
found for goal-related words.  The results provide evidence for accounts of automatic goal 
pursuit, which state that goals automatically guide attention to goal-relevant events.   
  Keywords: spatial attention; attentional bias; goals; motivation; intentions 
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 The last two decades have been marked by an enormous amount of research showing that 
goals often are activated and pursued automatically (Bargh, 1997; Shah, 2005).  Large parts of 
this research focused on the unconscious activation of goals (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; 
Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Troetschel, 2001).  But even when goals are 
activated consciously, the pursuit of a goal will be accompanied by the operation of automatic 
processes (for an overview see Ferguson, Hassin, & Bargh, 2008).  For instance, it has been 
shown that goal pursuit goes together with the automatic activation of goal-relevant information 
(Förster, Friedman, & Higgins, 2005) and the automatic inhibition of distracting information 
such as information relevant to conflicting goals (Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002).  
Moreover, Moors and De Houwer (2001) found that goal-congruent events evoke spontaneous 
positive evaluations whereas goal-incongruent events lead to spontaneous negative evaluations. 
 In a stimulus-overloaded world, it is of particular importance that goals point the 
individual at goal-relevant events in the environment.  Attention is regarded as the mechanism 
that allows focusing on a subset of possible sensory inputs or trains of thought (Luck & Vecera, 
2002).  Hence, attention is the process that filters which inputs will be further processed and 
which will not.  Prominent accounts of automatic goal pursuit therefore assume that goal-
relevant events attract attention automatically (Moskowitz, Li, & Kirk, 2004; Ferguson et al., 
2008).  In the present study, we investigated this hypothesis concerning two features of 
automaticity (for a discussion of automaticity features see Bargh, 1994, or Moors & De Houwer, 
2006), namely whether goal-relevant events will be attended to fast and unintentionally, that is, 
without an intention to attend to them. 
Goal-Driven but Unintended Attending 
 The idea that attention is for a large part goal-driven (i.e., allocated to goal-relevant 
information) can be found not only in models of goal pursuit but also in the literature on 
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attention (e.g., Yantis, 1998; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002).  In this field, goal-driven attention is 
often defined as the controlling of attention by the observer’s deliberate strategies and intentions 
(Yantis, 1998).  However, this definition leaves open whether the goal that drives attention is (a) 
a goal about the process of attending (e.g., directing attention towards a stimulus) or (b) a goal 
that does not imply the attentional process but that could influence it.  Illustrating the first option, 
the goal of wanting to eat an apple could cause a second goal, namely an intention to direct 
attention towards apples in the fruit basket.  Note that we define intention as the goal to engage 
in a process (Moors & De Houwer, 2006), in this case, as the goal to engage in the process of 
attending to goal-relevant events (i.e., apples in the fruit basket).  In this example, attending to 
goal-relevant events would be intended and in this respect not automatic.  In contrast, we 
hypothesize that goal-relevant events will also be attended to even when attending is not caused 
by an intention to attend to goal-relevant events.  For instance, an apple in another location in the 
room might grab one’s attention although one only intended to attend to apples in the fruit 
basket.  In this case, attention is driven by a goal (i.e., to eat an apple) without that this goal 
implied attending to this particular stimulus. 
Goal-Related Events 
 A second issue we are interested in is the kind of events that are attended to when goals 
guide the unintended allocation of attention.  Consider the goal of wanting to eat an apple.  In 
this case, apples are goal-relevant events.  We would therefore predict that apples are attended to 
automatically.  In addition to truly goal-relevant events, there is also a wide range of events that 
are merely related to the goal of eating apples, such as other fruits, apple juice, or apple pie.  
There might be situations in which attending to both goal-relevant and goal-related events is 
useful.  For instance, when one is hungry and therefore has the goal of eating an apple, apple pie 
and other fruits can fulfill the same need.  However, it would probably be dysfunctional when 
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attention would be allocated unconditionally to any goal-related event, especially when the goal 
is specific and goal-relevant events are therefore well defined (e.g., the individual only wants to 
eat an apple).   
Based on a similar reasoning, Veling and van Knippenberg (2006, see also 2008) 
investigated whether only goal-relevant or also goal-related knowledge is activated during the 
pursuit of a specific goal.  They conducted an experiment in which participants pursued the goal 
of reacting to a specific subset of exemplars (e.g., apples and bananas) from one semantic 
category (e.g., fruits).  These authors found that representations of other fruit exemplars (e.g., 
peaches and mangos) were inhibited.  Inhibition of goal-related but goal-irrelevant knowledge is 
assumed to take place because it shields goal pursuit against interference by this knowledge.  
However, this study does not allow conclusions about whether goal-related events are attended 
to.  It could be that especially early and automatic attentional processes are guided by a 
mechanism that does not allow a fine-grained distinction between goal-relevant and goal-related 
events (cf. Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Moores, Laita, & Chelazzi, 2003).  In the present study, 
we therefore investigated whether the fast and unintended allocation of attention to goal-relevant 
events is accompanied by goal shielding effects for goal-related events. 
Previous Evidence Regarding the Unintended Allocation of Attention to Goal-Relevant and 
Goal-Related Stimuli 
A recent study from our lab (Vogt, De Houwer, Moors, Van Damme, & Crombez, 2010; 
see also Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Vogt, De Houwer, & Crombez, in press) provided 
a first test of the hypothesis that goal-relevant but not goal-related events are attended to even in 
the absence of an intention to attend to them (even when both, goal-relevant and goal-related 
events, were linked to a motor response).  In this study, we combined an attention task with a 
separate, goal-inducing task.  In each trial of the goal task, a single word appeared in the middle 
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of the screen.  A goal was induced by asking participants to respond (by pressing the spacebar) 
when one of two particular words (e.g., “field” or “ship”) was presented in the middle of the 
screen.  Participants were financially rewarded when they correctly indicated the presence of the 
two words.  Consequently, we regarded these words as goal relevant. 
The attention task was a modified spatial cueing paradigm which allows studying covert 
attentional orienting to peripheral cues (cf. Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Koster, 
Crombez, Van Damme, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004).  In this task, participants have to 
detect visual probes presented at the left or right side of a fixation cross.  The probe is preceded 
by a visual cue at the same location (validly cued trials) or opposite location (invalidly cued 
trials).  Probes are usually detected faster on valid than on invalid trials.  This effect is typically 
referred to as the cue validity effect.  This effect is more pronounced for salient cues such as 
emotional stimuli (Fox et al., 2001; Koster et al., 2004).  Moreover, this task allows examining 
whether a cue affects the engagement component of attention (response time benefits for one cue 
category on valid trials due to the engagement of attention at the validly cued location) or the 
disengagement component (response time costs due to delayed disengagement of attention from 
the invalidly cued location), or both (see Cisler & Koster, 2010).   
In order to investigate the unintended allocation of attention to goal-relevant events, we 
used the goal-relevant words as cues in the spatial cueing paradigm.  We also presented goal-
related and control words as cues.  Goal-related words were synonyms of the goal-relevant 
words (e.g., “boat” when “ship” was the goal-relevant word).  Trials of the goal task and trials of 
the cueing task alternated.  This procedure allowed measuring the attentional processing of the 
goal-relevant and goal-related words while participants were simultaneously pursuing the goal.  
However, because goal and cueing task were two independent tasks, attending to the goal-
relevant stimulus in the cueing task was neither necessary nor instrumental for achieving the goal 
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implemented in the goal task.  Therefore, participants were not encouraged to set up an intention 
to attend to goal-relevant stimuli in the cueing task.  The results of our study showed that 
attention nevertheless was more strongly oriented to goal-relevant words compared to accessible 
control words.  In contrast, attending to goal-related words did not differ from attending to the 
control words, suggesting that goal-related words did not attract attention. 
The Present Study 
The preliminary study by Vogt et al. (2010) left open two questions that we aimed to 
address in the present study.  First, in the study by Vogt et al., a cue validity ratio of 75% valid 
cues was implemented, that is, 75% of the cues in the cueing task were predictive of the probe 
location.  This aspect of the design cannot be responsible for the fact that attention was more 
strongly oriented to goal-relevant cues than to other cues because the cue validity ratio made it 
instrumental to attend to all cue categories.  Nevertheless, it is possible that heightened attention 
for goal-relevant cues occurs only when directing attention to cues in general is instrumental.  
Hence, in the present study, we examined whether unintended attending to goal-relevant cues 
occurs also when attending to (goal-relevant or other) cues is not instrumental.  We did this by 
using a cue validity ratio of 50%, so that cues did not predict the probe location above chance 
level.   
Second, we were interested to see whether the effects for goal-related events obtained in 
the Vogt et al. study were caused by the specific characteristics of the goal in that study.  The 
goal task in that study required participants to respond to only two words that were visually 
distinct from the other stimuli.  Because of this, attentional orienting might have been guided by 
the visual representation of the goal-relevant words (e.g., the form of the letters of the words).  
This would explain why semantically similar but visually different words did not attract 
attention.  It is possible, however, that inattention to goal-related stimuli is limited to situations in 
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which the semantic meaning of goal-relevant events can be “turned off”.  In the present study, 
we used a goal task that forced participants to keep in mind the semantic meaning of the goal 
stimuli and we investigated attending to goal-related words under these conditions.  To this end, 
participants were asked not only to respond to goal-relevant words (e.g., “ship”) but also to 
pictures that represented the content of the goal-relevant words (i.e., different pictures showing a 
ship) in the goal task. 
Method 
Participants 
 Sixteen students (12 women) from different faculties at Ghent University participated.  
They were paid 5€ each.  All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were 
naive as to the purpose of the experiment. 
Apparatus and Materials 
The experiment was programmed and presented using the INQUISIT Millisecond 
software package (Inquisit 2.0, 2005) on a Dell Dimension 5000 computer with an 85 Hz, 17-
inch CRT monitor (Resolution: 1024 x 768).  All stimuli were presented against a black 
background. 
 Stimuli in the cueing task. 
We used the same four word pairs as Vogt et al. (2010): (1) stripe (streep) and work 
(werk), (2) line (lijn) and labor (arbeid), (3) field (akker) and boat (boot), and (4) land (veld) and 
ship (schip).  Each of the four pairs served one of the following functions in the modified spatial 
cueing task: (1) goal-relevant cues, (2) goal-related cues, (3) control cues, and (4) control-related 
cues.  The assignment of a function to a word pair was counterbalanced over participants.  We 
used control cues because, in principle, it is possible that attention is oriented to goal-relevant 
words not because they are goal relevant but because they were mentioned explicitly in the 
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instructions.  To control for such pre-exposure effects, control words were mentioned and had to 
be memorized during the instructions.  The synonyms of these control words (i.e., control-related 
cues) were used in the modified spatial cueing paradigm in order to have an appropriate control 
condition for the synonyms of the goal words (i.e., goal-related cues).   
The word pairs were constructed in the following manner.  Neutral words were chosen 
from the database of Hermans and De Houwer (1994), and were completed with neutral words 
that matched these words concerning word length and frequency as indicated by the WordGen 
tool (Duyck, Desmet, Verbeke, & Brysbaert, 2004).  The chosen synonyms were checked via the 
Thesaurus synonym tool of Microsoft Office Word 2003 and with native speakers.   
 Stimuli in the goal task. 
 In the goal task, four categories of stimuli were shown: (1) goal-relevant words, (2) goal-
relevant pictures, (3) control words, (4) control pictures, and filler stimuli.  Control words and 
pictures required no reaction in this task but were presented here to make sure that goal-relevant 
and control stimuli were presented equally often during the experiment.  Goal-relevant and 
control pictures were searched via the internet.  For each synonym pair (e.g., work and labor), six 
pictures were located by using the Dutch words as search term.  Additionally, four filler words 
and 24 filler pictures were used.  We used filler stimuli in order to be able to present the stimuli 
of the goal categories less often so that participants could not learn the visual features of these 
stimuli.  Filler pictures consisted of 12 colored rectangles and 12 pictures from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999).  According to the normative 
IAPS ratings, these picture were neutral to slightly positive (M = 6.45; SD = 1.73).1  
 Modified spatial cueing task. 
 Each trial of the modified spatial cueing task started with the presentation of a black 
fixation cross (5 mm high) placed in the middle of a white rectangle (4.5 cm high x 5.5 cm wide) 
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in the middle of the screen (Figure 1).  Along with this, two other white rectangles of the same 
size were presented, one to the left and one to the right of the middle rectangle.  The middle of 
each of these two peripheral rectangles was 9 cm from the fixation cross.  Cues and probes were 
presented within the peripheral rectangles.  After 500 ms, a cue word appeared for the duration 
of 250 ms.  Cue words were presented in Arial font size 20.  Immediately after cue offset, a 
probe consisting of a black square (0.8 cm x 0.8 cm) was presented.  Responses were made by 
pressing one of two keys (probe left: “q”; probe right: “5”) with the left and right index finger on 
an AZERTY keyboard.  A trial of this task ended after a response was registered or 1500 ms had 
elapsed since the onset of the probe.  In case an incorrect response was given, the word 
“ERROR” appeared for 200 ms in the middle of the screen.   
Each cue word and the probe were presented equally often in both spatial locations.  To 
control for responses to cues instead of probes, catch trials were presented.  On these trials, a 
probe did not follow the cue and no response was required.  In order to ensure that participants 
maintained fixation at the middle of the screen, digit trials were presented.  On these trials, the 
fixation cross was followed only by a randomly selected digit between 1 and 9 for a duration of 
50 ms.  Participants were instructed to report the digit aloud.  Responses on digit trials were not 
registered. 
 Goal task. 
The goal task started with the appearance of a word (presented in black and Arial font 
size 20) on a white background in the middle of the screen for 250 ms (Figure 1).  Hereafter, a 
red question mark (8 mm high) appeared in the middle of the screen, which indicated that 
participants should press the spacebar when the preceding stimulus in the middle of the screen 
had been a goal-relevant word or picture.  A trial of this task ended with a response or when 
2000 ms had elapsed since the onset of the question mark.  If a correct response was given after a 
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goal-relevant stimulus, the word “CORRECT” appeared for 200 ms in the middle of the screen.  
In case an incorrect response was given, the word “ERROR” appeared for 200 ms in the middle 
of the screen.   
Procedure 
 Instructions and practice phase. 
Participants were informed that a computer task would be administered, and gave a 
written informed consent.  They were seated approximately 60 cm from a computer screen.  All 
further instructions were presented on the computer screen.   
For the cueing task, participants were asked to respond as quickly and as accurately as 
possible to the location of the probe by pressing the corresponding key.  They were informed that 
a cue would precede the presentation of the probe.  Participants were instructed to maintain 
attention at the fixation cross.   
Participants were informed that after they responded to the probe of the cueing task, a 
word would be presented in the middle of the screen.  For the practice phase of the goal task, 
participants were asked to press the spacebar with both thumbs if one particular word had been 
presented.  Participants were informed that no fast reaction was required.  In the practice phase, 
stimuli (five words) different from those used in the test phase were used in the goal and cueing 
task.  The practice phase included 28 trials. 
 Test phase. 
Before the test phase, participants were presented with four words which were actually 
the two goal-relevant (e.g., land and ship) and the two control words (e.g., stripe and work) for 
the test phase.  Participants were not informed at this point that these words would be used in the 
test phase.  Participants were asked to memorize the words and to write them down after the 
words disappeared from the screen.  The experimenter checked whether the correct words were 
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written down.  This was repeated until all words were memorized correctly.  Hereafter, 
participants were told that the test phase would start.  The four words were shown again with the 
information that they would be used in the test phase.  Participants were instructed to indicate the 
presence of two of these words (e.g., land and ship) in the goal task.  Moreover, they were told 
that they were also required to indicate the presence of photos referring to the goal-relevant 
words (e.g., they were told to react when a photo referring to land or ship would be presented).  
Participants were informed that they would receive 5 points for correctly indicating the presence 
of the goal-relevant words and photos in this task.   
The test phase consisted of 140 trials of the spatial cueing task and 140 trials of the goal 
task.  For the spatial cueing task these were 128 test trials (32 trials for each of the four cue 
categories: goal-relevant, goal-related, control, and control-related), eight catch trials, and four 
digit trials.  The 140 trials of the goal task included 16 trials for each category (goal-relevant 
words, goal-relevant pictures, control words, and control pictures) and 76 filler trials (40 trials 
with a filler picture, 36 trials with a filler word).   
Trials of the modified spatial cueing task and the goal task alternated.  The inter-trial 
interval was 600 ms.  The order of trials was determined randomly for both tasks and for each 
participant separately.  The orders of the trials of the cueing task and of the trials of the goal task 
were selected independently of each other.  Hence, the cue words that were presented in a trial of 
the cueing task were not predictive of the word or picture that appeared in the following trial of 
the goal task.  Moreover, it was randomly determined which picture of the goal-relevant or 
control picture category was presented in a trial of the goal task, but the task was programmed in 
such a way that each picture had to be shown once before a picture was shown a second time.   
Results 
 Trials with errors were removed from the data (0.63%).  In line with the study of Vogt et 
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al. (2010), reaction times (RTs) shorter than 150 ms and longer than 750 ms were considered as 
outliers and excluded from the analysis (2.68%)2.  Means and standard deviations of the 
responses can be found in Table 1.  During the test phase, participants never responded on the 
catch trials, suggesting that none of the cues was associated with a systematic response bias.  
Participants made errors on 3.13% of the trials in the goal task (24% of these errors were missed 
reactions to goal-relevant stimuli, 76% were false alarms).   
We performed a 4 (cue category: goal relevant, goal related, control, control related) x 2 
(cue validity: valid, invalid) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the RTs.  This 
analysis revealed a significant effect of cue validity, F(1, 15) = 5.07, p < .05, ŋ2 = .252, with 
faster reactions on validly cued trials (M = 419 ms; SD = 60 ms) compared to invalidly cued 
trials (M = 432 ms; SD = 57 ms).  The main effect of category did not reach significance, F < 
1.79. 
Most importantly, the predicted interaction of cue validity and cue category was 
significant, F(3, 13) = 4.13, p < .03, ŋ2 = .488.  To further explore the interaction, we calculated 
cue validity indices for each cue category by subtracting RTs on valid trials from RTs on invalid 
trials (Table 1).  Planned comparisons were conducted in order to compare the cue validity 
indices of the different cue categories.  Supporting our hypotheses, the cue validity index for 
goal-relevant cues was significantly larger than the cue validity index for control cues, t(15) = 
2.99, p < .01, d = 1.10.  Further, the cue validity index for goal-relevant cues was also 
significantly larger than the cue validity index for goal-related cues, t(15) = 3.72, p < .01, d = 
1.33, and tended to be larger than the cue validity index for control-related cues, t(15) = 1.99, p = 
.065, d = 0.73.  The cue validity indices for control, goal-related, and control-related cues did not 
differ significantly from each other, ts < 1.63, ns.   
In order to investigate whether larger cue validity indices to goal-relevant cues were due 
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to faster engagement of attention to goal-relevant cues or to delayed disengagement of attention 
from goal-relevant cues, or to both processes, planned comparisons were conducted on valid and 
invalid trials separately.  On valid trials, participants responded as fast after goal-relevant cues as 
after all other cue categories, ts(15) < 1.52, ns, suggesting that goal-relevant cues did not engage 
attention in comparison to the other categories.  The differences between the other cue categories 
on valid trials were not significant, ts(15) < 1.01.  Only responses to goal-related cues on valid 
trials tended to be slower than responses to control-related cues on valid trials, t(15) = 1.82, p = 
.089, d = 0.56. 
Analyses on invalid trials showed that participants responded significantly slower after 
goal-relevant cues than after all other cue categories, ts(15) > 2.46, ps < .03, ds > 1.00.  This 
indicates delayed disengagement of attention from goal-relevant cues.  The differences between 
the other cue categories on invalid trials were not significant, ts < 1.   
Discussion 
The present study examined whether goal-relevant words evoked larger cue validity 
effects than control words, even when attending to goal-relevant words during the cueing task 
was not functional and hence pursuit of the intention to attend to these words was not likely.  
Additionally, we examined the attentional processing of words that were semantically related to 
the goal-relevant words.  In order to prevent that the semantic meaning of the goal-relevant 
words could be “turned off”, the goal task required participants to react to a variety of goal-
relevant pictures (i.e., pictures representing the content of the goal-relevant words) in addition to 
the goal-relevant words.  The results replicated those of Vogt et al. (2010) in that goal-relevant 
but not goal-related cues caused larger cue validity effects compared to other control stimuli.  
These results therefore confirm the conclusion that goal-relevant but not goal-related stimuli 
attract attention in an unintended manner.   
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The results of our study provide evidence for prominent accounts of automatic goal 
pursuit according to which goal-relevant stimuli attract attention automatically (Moskowitz et al., 
2004; Ferguson et al., 2008).  Our results suggest that attending to goal-relevant events is 
automatic in the sense of fast and unintended.  Two arguments support the claim that participants 
did not hold an intention to attend more strongly to the goal-relevant words than to the other 
words in the spatial cueing task.  First, goal-relevant words were task relevant in the goal task 
but not in the cueing task.  Making the distinction between the two tasks salient, goal-relevant 
words in the goal task and goal-relevant cues in the cueing task were presented at clearly 
different locations and at clearly different moments in time.  Second, unlike to what was the case 
in the study of Vogt et al. (2010), attending to (all) cues was not instrumental for the cueing task 
because cues did not predict the probe location above chance level3.  If anything, heightened 
attending to the (goal-relevant) cues could only hamper performance during the cueing task.  
Hence, there is no reason to assume that participants had the intention to attend to the cues, let 
alone to attend specifically to the goal-relevant cues.  By this, our results extend previous 
findings showing that attending to goal-relevant events is automatic in the sense of efficient 
(Moskowitz, 2002) or uncontrollable (Wieber & Sassenberg, 2006). 
Our results also convey which component of attentional orienting is affected by goal-
relevant cues.  First, goal-relevant words did not have a general distracting effect in that 
responses to probes were not significantly slower after goal-relevant cues than after the other 
cues.  Second, the analyses of responses on invalid trials indicated that larger cue validity effects 
for goal-relevant words were due mainly to delayed disengagement of attention from goal-
relevant words.  Interestingly, other studies investigating attentional orienting to highly 
threatening (Fox et al., 2001) or highly arousing events (Vogt, De Houwer, Koster, Van Damme, 
& Crombez, 2008) also revealed that such attentional biases are best characterized as a difficulty 
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to disengage from this information.  From a functional perspective, it makes sense that 
motivationally and goal-relevant stimuli evoke a difficulty to disengage attention because 
holding attention at a stimulus allows the organism to further process it and to react to it.  
Moreover, several authors suggest that attentional capture can only be found for events that are 
defined by simple visual features such as color (Stolz, 1996; Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004).   
Finally, our findings provide evidence for the selectivity of goal-driven but unintended 
attending.  Previous studies hinted to the importance of shielding goal pursuit from interference 
by goal-irrelevant information.  For instance, Shah and colleagues (2002) demonstrated that goal 
activation leads to the inhibition of information relevant to conflicting goals.  Dreisbach and 
Haider (2008) demonstrated that, when goal-relevant events are well defined and are therefore 
well distinguishable from goal-irrelevant events, goal-irrelevant information will be neglected 
and does not interfere with goal-directed behavior.  Furthermore, Veling and van Knippenberg 
(2006, 2008) found that the activation of a specific goal leads to the automatic inhibition of 
semantically related knowledge.  Our study extends these findings by demonstrating that the 
early and automatic allocation of attention already differentiates between goal-relevant and goal-
related events.  To the best of our knowledge, such a differentiation has never before been 
shown.  Moreover, in contrast to Vogt et al. (2010), participants in the present experiment could 
not turn off the semantic meaning of the goal-relevant words (i.e., they had to remember what 
the words represented in order to identify the pictures and could not fulfill the goal task by 
identifying the visual features of the word).  The present study therefore increases the ecological 
validity of this finding because in most real-life situations individuals are unlikely to forget the 
semantic meaning of goal-relevant events. 
Interestingly, recent models of attention suggest that attention is automatically guided by 
highly activated representations in working and long-term memory to stimuli in the environment 
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that match these representations (e.g., Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Soto, Hodsoll, Rotshtein, & 
Humphreys, 2008).  Moreover, different findings (Stolz, 1996; Moores et al., 2003; Kiefer & 
Martens, 2010) suggest that the activation of a semantic representation also leads to the preferred 
processing of information that is semantically related to this representation. Downing and Dodds 
(2004; see also Woodman & Luck, 2007) extended this view by showing that guidance does not 
necessarily mean heightened attending but can also imply inattention.  These authors found 
inattention to stimuli that matched activated information in working memory when this 
information was completely irrelevant for the currently performed task (i.e., information that had 
to be remembered for a subsequent task).  Downing and Dodds (2004) reasoned that information 
that is activated but not currently relevant might get inhibited in order to prevent that attention is 
(mis)guided.  Similarly, one could assume that also in our study representations of goal-relevant 
events were activated leading to heightened attention to goal-relevant events whereas the 
(lexical) representations of the synonyms were inhibited resulting in inattention to goal-related 
stimuli.   
In conclusion, the present data provide further evidence that goal pursuit is accompanied 
by the operation of automatic processes.  In particular, they show that goals influence already the 
first step of the processing of an incoming stimulus, that is, its attentional processing.  Moreover, 
our findings show that this early level of attentional processing is selective, meaning that 
attention is allocated to goal-relevant events but not to goal-related events. 
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Footnotes 
1 Picture numbers were: 1610, 1640, 1660, 2010, 2270, 2630, 5870, 5891, 7002, 7330, 7351, and 
7450. 
2 The same effects were revealed when the medians of the RTs were used (cf. Ratcliff, 1993).   
3 The general cue validity effect was much weaker in this study (M = 13 ms, SD = 23 ms; F(1, 
15) = 5.07, p < .05, ŋ2 = .252) than in Experiment 2 of Vogt et al. (M = 33 ms; SD = 37 ms; F(1, 
29) = 23.03, p < .001, ŋ2 = .443) in which 75% of the trials were valid.  This suggests that 
participants in our study made little use of the cue position as a predictor for the probe position.   
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Table 1 
Mean Reaction Times, Standard Deviations, and Cue Validity Indices (in ms) as a Function of Cue Category and Cue Validity. 
 
 
 
 
Valid 
 
Invalid 
 
Cue validity indices 
Cue category M SD M SD M SD 
 
Goal-relevant words 
 
416 
 
60 
 
447 
 
70 
 
31 
 
30 
Goal-related words 426 60 425 50 -1 25 
Control words 419 57 427 55 8 22 
Control-related words 416 67 430 59 14 40 
 Note. Cue validity indices were calculated by subtracting reaction times on valid trials from reactions times on invalid trials. 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Schematic overview of two example trials of the combined spatial cueing and goal 
task.  The first three boxes depict the spatial cueing task in which the presentation of a 
cue word was followed by a probe (black square) which had to be localized.  The last two 
boxes display the goal task in which the presentation of a single word or picture was 
followed by the appearance of a question mark.  Participants had to react to the question 
mark by pressing the spacebar when the single word or picture presented in the middle of 
the screen had been a goal-relevant word or picture.  The left side illustrates a validly 
cued trial of the spatial cueing task, the right side an invalidly cued trial of this task.  
 
 
 
Unintended attending to goal-relevant but not to goal-related events 
 
26 
 
Figure 1. 
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